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A large research program in economics has 
established a persuasive link between institu-
tions and economic development. But what does 
this imply for development policymaking? Can 
a political leader or aid agency seeking to pro-
mote development readily change institutions? 
This article starts off wildly general, and then 
moves to specifics.
I.  The Intellectual History of  
the World, Part I
Every once in a while, it is worthwhile for 
economists to look up from the details of their 
specialized research projects to the broader 
worldview that their research results fit or do 
not fit. Nowhere is this truer than in the field 
of institutional economics, which can hardly 
avoid the big picture as it seeks to understand 
the determinants of institutions and make policy 
recommendations about changing them.
Two contrasting worldviews coexist in insti-
tutional economics, which go all the way back 
to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Let us 
label these views “top down” versus “bottom up.” 
The top down view of institutions sees them as 
determined by laws written by political leaders 
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(the view of most Enlightenment intellectuals 
like Rousseau and Condorcet). The bottom up 
view sees institutions instead as emerging spon-
taneously from the social norms, customs, tra-
ditions, beliefs, and values of individuals within 
a society, with the written law only formalizing 
what is already mainly shaped by the attitudes 
of individuals (the view of the leading critic 
of the top-down French Revolution, Edmund 
Burke).
The two worldviews have very different 
implications for institutional change. In the top 
down view, the political leadership can start 
with a blank slate, tearing up the old laws and 
making new laws at any time (as was attempted 
in the French Revolution). The bottom up view 
sees current institutions as heavily constrained 
by previous institutions. Institutional change in 
the bottom up view is always gradual, evolution-
ary rather than revolutionary.
The two views also have very different 
implications for the role of economists or other 
“experts.” In the top down view, there is a heavy 
burden on economists to determine the optimal 
institutions to recommend to political leaders, 
using theory and empirics to design new insti-
tutions from scratch. In the bottom up view, 
there is a much more specialized role for econo-
mists, who at best can recommend desirable 
incremental changes, subject to the constraint 
that institutional reforms cannot attempt “too 
much” without disrupting the functioning of the 
economy by much more than is justified by the 
benefits of the “desirable change.”
In the top down view, economists recommend 
institutions through pure reason. In the bottom 
up view, economists express reluctance to make 
drastic changes to institutions whose rationale 
they cannot fully comprehend, showing respect 
for the historical evolution that has somehow 
yielded today’s institutions. This is not to advo-
cate the extreme view that “what is, is right,” 
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only the more modest view that “what is, is for 
a reason.” The reason a particular institution has 
emerged (even if it is a bad reason) will certainly 
affect the consequences of attempts to change 
that institution.
Even if the bottom up economists can think 
of NO reason why a particular institution exists, 
they are still cautious about changing existing 
institutions abruptly (assuming such institu-
tions are not too obviously destructive) with 
the knowledge that there is SOME reason, not 
yet understood and perhaps never to be under-
stood, for their existence. As Richard Dawkins 
said about the analogous exercise in evolution-
ary biology of trying to understand the rationale 
for the anatomy of each species, “evolution is 
smarter than you are.”
The top down view also tends to go together 
with the view that there is one globally unique best 
set of institutions, toward which all societies are 
hopefully thought to be “developing.” The devel-
opment economist acts as a cross-country com-
municator of the institutions of the “advanced” 
society to the less informed in the “backward” 
society. The bottom up view of institutions is 
more open to the possibility that societies evolve 
different institutions even in the long run.
This absurdly grand and brief tour of intellec-
tual history has painted these two worldviews 
as opposing extremes, which is a caricature 
—most views lie somewhere in between. The 
top down view is seldom advocated explicitly, 
but is implicit in the traditional analysis in aid 
agencies that sees institutions as something the 
central government must create to make pos-
sible the functioning of a market economy. The 
aid agencies’ agenda for “second generation” 
institutional reforms (following the “first gener-
ation” of policy reforms) is an example of such a 
top down view. Nor is the most extreme bottom 
up view tenable, or we would not need formal 
states and laws at all, whereas in fact they are 
ubiquitous.
Yet the apparent effectiveness of top down for-
mal institutions in rich societies may still depend 
on these institutions having evolved from the 
bottom up. If so, then attempting to introduce 
formal institutions into poor societies where 
bottom up factors are lacking will not replicate 
the institutional successes of rich countries.
The top down view is thrown into sharpest 
relief by the criticisms of its opponents, a long 
list including Edmund Burke, Karl Popper, 
Isaiah Berlin, Friedrich Hayek, P. T. Bauer, 
and Thomas Sowell. Another economist who 
enriched our view of the shortcomings of the 
top down approach is the late John McMillan, to 
whose memory this session is dedicated.
II.  Institutional Economics and  
Development Policy
Economists have provided partial insights 
into how institutions can emerge spontaneously 
from the bottom up, albeit not a general theory. 
Avinash Dixit (2004) summarized a number of 
models of bottom up institutions that are feasible 
even in a lawless society (the mafia being a clas-
sic example, but not the only one). Avner Greif’s 
pioneering research (summarized in Greif 
2006) suggested how networks of merchants 
can enforce contracts in the absence of any for-
mal institutions. Marcel Fafchamps (2004) has 
demonstrated the pervasive importance of such 
networks in Africa.
Dixit’s (2004) insights on institutional change 
are an example of how useful insights from 
partial models can be, even without a compre-
hensive theory of institutions. Suppose contract 
enforcement depends in part on an informal 
system where one does not cheat one’s busi-
ness partners for fear of losing one’s reputation 
and opportunity to do repeat business with the 
network of business partners. When an alterna-
tive formal system is introduced alongside the 
informal network all at once, this allows oppor-
tunistic individuals to cheat their partners in the 
informal network, then exit the network for the 
new system. The old network can break down 
more rapidly than the new system starts func-
tioning, leading to a net decline in contracts 
executed and economic activity. This is a nice 
cautionary tale for the proponents of abrupt top-
down changes to institutions.
Aid policy shows little awareness of such sub-
tleties. One of the most notorious failures of top 
down reform was “shock therapy” in the former 
Soviet Union, an attempt to shift instantaneously 
to the institutions of capitalism from those of 
Communism. The drop in output was one of the 
worst on record, in contrast to the rapid growth 
of China that followed a more gradualist, evolu-
tionary approach to changing from Communism 
to capitalism.
The increased emphasis on fighting cor-
ruption in poor nations beginning about the 
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mid-1990s in the aid agencies has yet to show 
discernible payoff in lessening corruption (or 
redirecting aid to corruption-free channels). The 
share of aid going to corrupt countries actually 
increased in the late 1990s and early twenty-
first century, to 80 percent (where “corrupt” 
is defined as a score of 2 or less on the ICRG 
index that goes from 0—most corrupt—to 6— 
least corrupt). The share of aid going to cor-
rupt countries increased not because of chang-
ing composition of aid recipients, but because 
the same aid recipients became more corrupt 
(William Easterly and Tobias Pfutze, forthcom-
ing). Similarly, there is little sign of payoff to aid 
agencies’ efforts at about the same time to pro-
mote democracy from the top down. Only about 
20 percent of aid goes to countries classified by 
Freedom House as “free,” a proportion that has 
not changed over time despite much rhetoric to 
the contrary.
III.  Land Titles in Africa
Finally, to get as concrete as possible, let us 
examine one very specific kind of top down 
institutional reform—the attempt to introduce 
land titles to resolve uncertainty over property 
rights in land in Africa.
The theme of land titles improving incentives 
is an old one in Africa. For example, a colonial 
research commission in 1938 concluded about 
land registration: “all discussions on the subject 
agree as to the value of giving security to the 
occupier of land . … legal security against attack 
or disturbance can most effectively be guaranteed 
by registration (Lord Hailey 1938, 868, 876).” 
The World Bank in 2003 expressed pretty 
much the same viewpoint, as if very little had 
changed in 65 years: “{Land} arrangements 
found in many countries are often not optimal 
from either an economic or a social perspec-
tive. For example, in Africa, the vast majority of 
the land area is operated under customary ten-
ure arrangements that, until very recently, were 
not even recognized by the state and therefore 
remained outside the realm of the law” (xviii).
Despite decades of attempts to register land 
titles, during both the colonial and indepen-
dence eras, today only about 1 percent of land 
in Africa is registered under the formal system 
(Commission for Africa 2005, 231). Clearly, 
something about the top down registration of 
land titles is not working.
In Africa, there has been a long historical 
evolution of customary rights to land, which are 
often quite complex in giving different parts of 
the “bundle of rights” implied by land ownership 
to different parties at different times during the 
harvest cycle. Issuing a land title to yet another 
party can increase rather than decrease uncer-
tainty about who has what rights to the land.
Indeed, a number of empirical studies show 
little effect of land titles on the incentive to invest. 
In Kenya, an ambitious plan to introduce land 
titles was introduced even before independence 
(the Swynnerton Plan of 1954). However, much 
subsequent research showed little constructive 
effect of land titling. For example, Shem E. 
Migot-Adholla and Frank Place (1998) showed a 
weak effect of land titles in Kenya on perceived 
land rights of farmers, credit use, and land yields 
(a measure of investment in the land).
The anthropologist Parker Shipton (1988) 
looked at the consequences of land titling for the 
Luo tribe in western Kenya in the early 1980s. 
The traditional system among the Luo was a 
complicated maze of swapping plots between 
kin and seasonal exchanges of land for labor 
and livestock. Each household’s claims to land 
included many plots of different soils and ter-
rains, on which many different crops grew, not 
a bad system with which to diversify risk in an 
uncertain climate. The traditional land patrons 
(weg lowo) would often give temporary land 
rights to clients ( jodak).
Land titling brought new uncertainties into 
this complex system. Would the government 
give the titles to the weg lowo or to the jodak? 
The system inclined toward the latter, foster-
ing bitter conflict between the two groups. 
Sometimes the former weg lowo would wind up 
as the jodak of his former jodak. Other times, 
claimants would not bother with adjudication, 
as the costs exceeded the value of the property. 
Although land sales increased after formal reg-
istration, neither the buyers nor sellers wanted 
the high fees or red tape to register sales. The 
system of formal titles thus gradually lost cor-
respondence with whom the locals knew owned 
the land.
Moreover, land titling may have increased 
rather than decreased the scope for the kind of 
opportunistic behavior that institutions are sup-
posed to prevent. Sellers who pledged their land 
as collateral for a loan would fail to inform the 
buyer of this claim on the land. Banks found it 
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politically difficult to auction off the collateral 
land after default, since land owned by kin of 
the defaulter surrounded it. Some sellers sold to 
several buyers at once, using different elders as 
witnesses.
In an illustrative anecdote from Shipton, 
Ocholla Ogweng of Kanyamkago got a loan of 
30,000 Kenyan shillings from Barclay’s Bank 
in 1979. To raise collateral, he asked the help 
of his wife’s father, Ogwok Nyayal. Mr. Nyayal 
arranged with his sister’s husband, Mr. Alloyce 
Ohero, to pledge his land as collateral for Mr. 
Ogweng’s loan. Alloyce Ohero then sold part 
of his land to two strangers, without inform-
ing them of the Barclay’s Bank lien, and they 
settled on the land. Mr. Ohero died in 1981 and 
Mr. Ogweng defaulted on his loan. The two 
sons of Alloyce Ohero expected to inherit the 
unsold part of his land, equally unaware of the 
Barclay’s Bank claim. By 1982, a court broker 
prepared to auction off all of Mr. Ohero’s former 
land on behalf of Barclay’s, to the consternation 
of everyone involved. The two strangers blamed 
Mr. Ohero’s sons, who blamed their uncle Ogwok 
Nyayal, who blamed Alloyce Ohero, who if he 
were alive would blame Ocholla Ogweng.
Other studies throughout Africa bear out the 
picture of ineffective land titling. A study of land 
titles in Burkina Faso (Anne-Sophie Brasselle, 
Frederic Gaspart, and Jean-Philippe Platteau 
2002) found no effect of land titles on incentives 
to invest in the land. Kathryn Firmin-Sellers 
and Patrick Sellers (1999) found that a land 
titling program in Cameroon was not success-
ful in consolidating individual property rights, 
although it had some other benefits. Hanan G. 
Jacoby and Bart Minten (2007) found no effect 
of land titles on plot-specific investment in rice 
fields in Madagascar. Klaus Deininger and 
Songqing Jin (2006) have recently summarized 
the literature on land titles in Africa as show-
ing little or no effect of titles on investment or 
access to credit, although they found evidence 
that a more general measure of “tenure secu-
rity” in Ethiopia (not dependent on titles, which 
did not exist) fostered land investments.
Shem E. Migot-Adholla et al. (1991) long 
ago presented evidence that indigenous prop-
erty systems in Africa, far from being static, 
have themselves spontaneously evolved toward 
more individualized land rights in response to 
increased population pressure. They argued 
therefore that the indigenous systems do not 
constrain investments in increased land produc-
tivity. Jean-Philippe Platteau 1996 also argued 
that there is little evidence of any benefit of for-
mal land rights compared to indigenous systems. 
Lorenzo Cotulla (2007) and Karol Boudreaux 
and Paul Dragos Alicia (2007) provide more 
recent statements of this same view, albeit with 
some variations and cautionary notes that indig-
enous evolution is not a panacea for optimal 
outcomes.
After all this research and experience, the 
aid donors today remain stuck on some kind 
of idealized comprehensive (top down) govern-
ment reform that would somehow make formal 
registration of land titles “optimal.” The United 
Nations Millennium Project (2005) said, for 
example: “The rule of law involves security in 
private property and tenure rights . … upholding 
the rule of law requires institutions for govern-
ment accountability. … this requires a well func-
tioning and adequately paid civil service and 
judiciary, proper information technology (for 
registration of property . … )” (31, 111). Here, the 
donors’ answer is more computers to register 
formal land titles!
The World Bank (2003) Land Policies for 
Growth and Poverty Reduction concedes many 
of the problems with government land regis-
tration discussed above, but still concludes the 
answer is even more intensive and comprehen-
sive top-down government planning:
The establishment of a land policy frame-
work to guide the sequencing of specific 
interventions in the sector can have multi-
ple benefits in generating consensus, help-
ing to prioritize actions, and (by ensuring 
participation in the implementation and 
monitoring of these interventions) avoid-
ing costly errors. Given the long-term 
nature of interventions in the area of 
land policy … integration into the broader 
development strategy is particularly rel-
evant to provide a basis for relating land 
policy to other interventions (179).
IV.  Conclusion
Is the bottom up view of institutions hopelessly 
pessimistic? It certainly undermines the naïve 
optimism implied by aid agency recommenda-
tions that institutions can be rapidly changed 
from the top by political leaders. Even without a 
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comprehensive theory of institutions, historical 
evidence, contemporary research, and common 
sense suggest that institutional change is gradual 
in the large majority of cases. Attempts at rapid, 
top down change can even have negative con-
sequences. If that is reality, then an agenda of 
gradual reform that recognizes the constraints 
of bottom up evolution will lead to more hopeful 
results than a delusory top down attempt to leap 
to institutional perfection.
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